UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-4-2009

State v. Beavers Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36183

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Beavers Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36183" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2640.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2640

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

NOS. 36183 & 36191

)

MARK BEAVERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE CHARLES W. HOSACK
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 6247
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. .................................................................. 20
ftARGUMENT. ....................................................................................................... 21

I.

In Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Erred In
Failing To Instruct The Jury On The Affirmative Defense
Of Necessity
...................................................................................... 21
A. Introduction

...................................................................................... 21

B. Applicable Legal Standards ................................................................ 21
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District
Court Should Have Instructed The Jury On The Affirmative
Defense Of Necessity ......................................................................... 24
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat
Of Immediate Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal
Condition ...................................................................................... 24
2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He
Did Not Bring About The Harm (The Debilitating
Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His Illegal
Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana ............................ 26
3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The
Same Objective, i.e., A Modest Recovery, Could Not
Have Been Accomplished By A Less Offensive
Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him .................................... 26

4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The
Conclusion That The Harm Caused, i.e., Commission
Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was Not
Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e.,
Mr. Beavers' Continued Suffering And lncapacitation .................... 28
II. The District Court Erred In Mr. Beavers' Second Case By
Refusing To Allow Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence In
Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense, And By
Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense ...................................... 28
A. Introduction

...................................................................................... 28

B. Applicable Legal Standards ................................................................ 29
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' Second Case, The
District Court Should Have Allowed Mr. Beavers To
Present Evidence Relating To The Affirmative Defense
Of Necessity, And It Should Have Instructed The Jury
About That Defense ............................................................................ 30
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat
Of Immediate Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal
Condition ......................................................................................31

2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did
Not Bring About The Harm (The Debilitating
Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His Illegal
Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana ............................ 32

3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The
Same Objective, i.e., A Modest Recovery, Could Not
Have Been Accomplished By A Less Offensive
Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him .................................... 32
4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The
Conclusion That The Harm Caused, i.e., Commission
Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was Not
Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e.,
Mr. Beavers' Continued Suffering And lncapacitation .................... 34

ii

Ill. The District Court Erred At Mr. Beaver's Joint Sentencing
Hearing By Enhancing Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The
Second Case Based On Its Finding That He Had Been
Previously Convicted Of Certain Drug Offenses In The
First Case
...................................................................................... 35
A. Introduction

...................................................................................... 35

B. Standard Of Review ............................................................................ 37
C. Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Could Not Be
Enhanced Based On His Prior Convictions In The First Case
Because Those Prior Convictions Did Not Exist At The Time
That He Allegedly Committed The Offenses At Issue In The
Second Case ...................................................................................... 37
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................41
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...............................................................................42

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bray v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1985) .......................................... 39
Gargliano v. State, 639 A.2d 675 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) ........................................ 39
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) ................................................. 33
Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 208 P.3d

149 (2009) .......................................................................................................37
People v. Phillips, 502 N.E.2d 80 (Ill. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986) ............................. 39
Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653 (1968) ....................................... 23
State v. Ahakuelo, 683 P.2d 400 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) ...................................... 39
State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341,715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App.1986) ......................... 38
State v. Brezillac, 573 P.2d 1343 (1978) ............................................................ .40
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 & n.2, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 & n.2 (Ct. App.

2000) .........................................................................................................22, 35
State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319,882 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994) ................. 24, 29
State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 339, 971 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1998) ......... 38
State v. Gehrke, 474 N.W.2d 722, 726 (S.D. 1991) ........................................... .40
State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816,817 & n.1, 673 P.2d 416,417 & n.1 (1983) ..... 22
State v. Hanington, 133 Idaho 563,990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999) ..................... 38
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854,801 P.2d 563 (1990) ......................................21
State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874,920 P.2d 391 (1996) ........................................ 23
State v. Nicholas, 491 So.2d 711 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986) ........................... .40
State v. Osoba, 672 P .2d 1098 (Kan. 1983) .......................................................39
State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P .2d 630, 641 (Ak. Ct. App. 1983) ............................... 39

iv

State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999) ......................................... 23
State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008) ........................................ 30
State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001) ......................... 23
United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008) ........................... 38

Statutes
I.C. §§ 37-2739, -2739A, and -2732(B)(a)(7) ...................................................... 37

Rules
I. R. C. P. 41 (6) ......................................................................................................23

Other Authorities
I.C.J.I. 1500 cmt ..................................................................................................22
I.C.J.I. 1512 .........................................................................................................22

V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After police raided his home and discovered harvested still-growing marijuana,
Mark Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possessing marijuana with
the intent to deliver it. This was the First Case. While Mr. Beavers was out on bond,
awaiting trial, in the First Case, he sold additional marijuana to an undercover police
officer, was arrested, and had his car and his automobile searched. Again, police found
harvested and still-growing marijuana.

This time, he was charged with delivery of

marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver it, and trafficking

in

marijuana. In separate trials, where Mr. Beavers attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to
present necessity defenses (on the basis that the marijuana seized in both cases was
intended for his personal use and was necessary to treat his various medical
conditions), but was thwarted to varying degrees by the respective district courts,
Mr. Beavers was found guilty. At a joint sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that
Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his "prior
convictions" in the First Case, and it imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years,
with three years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Beavers presents three distinct claims of error: (1) the district
court erred in the First Case by refusing to instruct the jury regarding the common law
defense of necessity; (2) the district court erred in the Second Case by precluding
Mr. Beavers from presenting evidence in support of a necessity defense and by refusing
to instruct the jury regarding that defense; and (3) the district court erred at the joint
sentencing hearing insofar as it concluded that Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second
Case could be enhanced by convictions in the First Case, even though no convictions

1

had actually been entered in the First Case as of the time that Mr. Beavers allegedly
committed the offenses at issue in the Second Case.

In light of these errors,

Mr. Beavers respectfully requests new trials in both cases or, in the alternative, a new
joint sentencing hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
. On August 13, 2006, based on a claim that the odor of marijuana was coming
from Mark Beavers' property in Coeur D'Alene, police obtained a warrant authorizing a
search of Mr. Beavers' property and vehicles. 1

(R., pp.32-26.) 2

In executing that

warrant later the same day, officers found a number of marijuana plants growing in
Mr. Beavers' two greenhouses, a couple additional marijuana plants in Mr. Beavers'
basement, and, primarily in Mr. Beavers' kitchen, various vessels containing loose
marijuana. (R., pp.37-38.) Officers also found literature about marijuana, paraphernalia
for smoking marijuana, and two scales. (R., pp.30, 37-38.)
Based on the items discovered in his home, Mr. Beavers was arrested at the
scene (R., p.43) and, on or about August 28, 2006, 3 was charged, in Kootenai County

1

The officer requesting the search warrant presented additional information in support
of his request, one piece of which was considered by the magistrate who eventually
authorized the warrant. (See Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.12, L.10 - p.13, L.17.)
That additional piece of information consisted of the officer's claim that Mr. Beavers'
power records showed "cycles that are unusual for a normal usage. They start low,
they continually grow higher until they peak, and then suddenly drops off and that cycle
starts over. This, through my training and experience, is very indicative of marijuana
grow power usage." (Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.) However, the district
court later concluded that this particular piece of information were "false and reflected a
reckless disregard for the truth." (R., pp.230-33.)
2
The district court filings from the two cases consolidated in this appeal have been
combined by the district court clerk into a single Clerk's Record.
3
The discrepancy between the arrest date and the date of the filing of the complaint
appears to stem from the fact that the State dismissed its original case against
2

Case No. CR-06-18813 (hereinafter, First Case), with two counts of trafficking in
marijuana-one count for possessing more than 25 pounds of marijuana and one count
for possessing 25 or more marijuana plants-and one count of possession of marijuana
with the intent to deliver.

(R., pp.50-51; see also R., pp.66-67 (October 10, 2006

Information).)
On September 26, 2007, well in advance of Mr. Beavers' trial in the First Case,
he submitted his requested jury instructions. (R., pp.244-50.) They included a request
for an instruction of the affirmative defense of necessity. (R., pp.247-48.)
Not long after Mr. Beavers had requested a jury instruction on the necessity
defense, the State moved in /imine to preclude Mr. Beavers from offering any evidence
concerning his need to use marijuana for medicinal reasons.

(R., pp.258-59.)

At a

hearing of November 8, 2007, the district court heard arguments on that motion. (See

generally, Tr. Vol. I, p.121, L.2 - p.134, L.23.)4 At that hearing, the parties' counsel
debated the availability of a necessity defense where the defendant is charged with
trafficking and possession with intent to deliver, not just simple possession (see Tr. Vol.
I, p.121, L.22 - p.133, L.5), but the district court ultimately denied the State's motion in

Mr. Beavers, and immediately re-filed, all in an effort to circumvent Mr. Beavers' right to
a speedy preliminary hearing. (See R., p.23.)
4
There is a number of transcripts in the Record on Appeal in this consolidated appeal.
The longest one, consisting of approximately 20 different court proceedings, including
the June 16-19, 2008 trial in the First Case, and the January 30, 2009 joint sentencing
hearing, is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I"; the transcript of the proceedings of January
14, 2008 is referenced as "Tr. Vol. II"; the transcript of the proceedings of March 3, 2008
is referenced as 'Tr. Vol. Ill"; the transcript of the proceedings of May 12, 2008 is
referenced as "Tr. Vol. IV"; the transcript of the proceedings of October 28, 2008, the
first day of the trial in the Second Case, is referenced as 'Tr. Vol. V"; and the transcript
of the proceedings of October 29-30, 2008, the second and third days of the trial in the
Second Case, is referenced as "Tr. Vol. VI."
3

limine because, at the very least, Mr. Beavers might be requesting a jury instruction on

the lesser-included offense of simple possession. (Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L.6 - p.134, L.23.)
In the midst of Mr. Beavers' June 2008 trial, after the State had rested, the State
presented a new, but closely related, motion in limine. This time, the Stale requested
that Mr. Beavers be precfuded from offering any testimony concerning "his medical
condition and things tied to his medical condition and treating it with marijuana," and,
further, asking the district court not to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.779, L.8 - p.780, L.22.) Instead of arguing that the necessity defense was
unavailable to Mr. Beavers as a matter of law based on the nature of the charges, this
time the State focused on what it perceived to be a lack of evidence to support the
necessity defense. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.783, Ls.15-25.) The crux of the State's argument
was that "the burden is going to be on Mr. Beavers to prove a necessity defense, and
there is no indication from all the discovery in the file and all the discussions with
counsel that Mr. Beavers is going to be able to meet that threshold requirement to
submit a necessity instruction to the jury." (Tr. Vol. I, p.780, Ls.7-12.) However, once
again, the district court denied the State's motion in I/mine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.785, L.9 p.787, L.10.) It indicated that it would not limit the defendant's ability to present his
defense, especially where evidence of Mr. Beaver's medicinal use of marijuana was
relevant to whether he had the intent to deliver marijuana, as charged in Count Ill of the
State's Information; instead, it indicated that it would decide, after all the evidence had
been presented, whether to instruct the jury on the necessity defense. (Tr. Vol. I, p.785,
L.25-p.787, L.10.)

4

In light of the district court's ruling allowing him to present his defense, he offered
extensive testimony concerning his health problems and his medicinal use of marijuana.
Mr. Beavers testified that, approximately twelve years earlier, he began suffering acute
gastrointestinal distress, "having pain and discomfort in the rectal area" and "passing
blood and some kind of fluid." (Tr. Vol. I, p.791, L.17 - p.792, L.1.) He further testified
that this condition worsened to where he became incontinent and had to begin wearing
a diaper, and that the incontinence grew to become a daily occurrence.

(Tr. Vol. I,

p.792, L.2 - p.793, L.4.) Mr. Beavers indicated that, as his gastrointestinal problems
worsened, he also developed frequent, severe headaches. (Tr. Vol. I, p.792, Ls.4-11.)
Eventually, Mr. Beavers began suffer fatigue and depression as well. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793,
Ls.16-20.)

Mr. Beavers testified that his cramps, aches, and pains quickly became

debilitating, such that he was unable to work. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, L.13 - p.794, L.5.)
Mr. Beavers testified that, initially, although he feared that he had cancer, he did
not seek professional medical care for his symptoms because he had no medical
insurance and could not afford to pay for medical care out of his own pocket. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.794, L.20 - p.795, L.6, p.798, Ls.6-16.)

Accordingly, Mr. Beavers took a holistic,

naturopathic approach to attempting to improve his health. (Tr. Vol. I, p.795, Ls.7-20.)
He improved his diet by giving up prepared foods in favor of home-cooked meals
prepared with organic ingredients and containing more fruits and vegetables; he starting
doing yoga and meditating; and he began exercising regularly. (Tr. Vol. I, p.795, L.21 p.796, L.25.) While these measures, undoubtedly helped Mr. Beavers, they did not cure
him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, Ls.1-4.) Thus, after months of research and self-study, he began
growing marijuana to use as medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, L.5 - p.799, L.4.) Initially,

5

Mr. Beavers smoked the marijuana he grew; however, as his research progressed, he
came to believe that his health problems could be better managed by also integrating
marijuana into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.12-19.) He learned that the "bud material
[from the marijuana plant] is really more appropriately smoked," and that the leaf
material (the "shake") "has its best medicinal effect when you process it and you put it in
the food and eat it." (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.5-15.) Furthermore, because the "the effects
[of these alternative means of ingestion] are very different" (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.14-15),
and they affected Mr. Beavers' various symptoms in different ways, Mr. Beavers used
both methods of ingestion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.807, L.19 - p.808, L.4.) Mr. Beavers testified
that this holistic, naturopathic approach to his medical condition seemed to work, as his
dietary changes, exercise, and use of marijuana coincided with an improvement in his
condition. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.16 - p.856, L.7.)
At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial in Mr. Beavers' First Case,
the district court combined Counts I (trafficking by possession of a certain weight of
marijuana) and II (trafficking by possession of a certain number of marijuana plants),
such that a single count of trafficking (written in the alternative, whereby the jury could
find Mr. Beavers guilty of trafficking if it found that he possessed either the requisite
weight or the requisite number of plants) would go to the jury. 5 (R., p.540; see also
Tr. Vol. I, p.886, L.16 - p.889, L.7 (State's objection to the district court's combination of
the two counts, and district court's explanation of its reasoning for doing so).)

5

The district court's decision to combine Counts I and II into a single count of trafficking
had no effect on Count Ill (possession with intent to deliver), which also went to the jury
as originally charged. (See R, pp.547-49.)
6

At this point in the trial, the district court also indicated that it would not be
instructing the jury on the defense of necessity. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.889, L.23 - p.895,
L.9.) The district court stated its reasoning as follows:
[T]he test is an objective standard. In other words, the subjective
testimony of the defendant would be insufficient to establish the, in and of
itself, would be insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the
evidence in the record supported the giving of a [necessity] defense
[instruction]. I would agree that in State versus Hastings there is nothing
there to indicate that the medical necessity defense would not be
[available] ... with regard to a trafficking charge.
However, in this case the Court is concluding that certainly with
regard to the trafficking charge there is no-under no objective standard is
there any evidence here that would indicate that the amounts involved
were necessary in order to treat the condition. So the Court is pretty
comfortable with an absolute absence of evidence with regard to that
element on the trafficking charge.
With regard to a lesser included of simple possession of
marijuana, should the jury get to that, the question is a closer one because
of the State versus Hastings case, but again because of the
uncontroverted evidence with regard to the amounts here and the lack of
evidence with regard-other than subjective testimony of the defendant
himself which of course is certainly pertinent and relevant on a mens rea
element of why he is possessing the substances, doesn't establish, in the
Court's view, sufficiency of the evidence to meet the elements of the
defense, either the specific threat of immediate harm or that the same
objective could not be accomplished by significantly smaller amounts or,
for that matter, some other alternative method that is available.
So the Court's ruling even on the lesser included of the possession
charge, should the jury get to that, while State versus Hastings certainly
indicates that the necessity defense is not barred as a matter of law, that
has not been the ruling by this court. The Court has ruled specifically over
the state's objection that the necessity defense was available. It is the
Court's view that the proof in this case is insufficient as a matter of law to
justify granting-giving the instruction of common law necessity defense,
even with regard to the lesser of the simple possession of marijuana, and
certainly it does not apply to the trafficking charge.

7

(Tr. Vol. I, p.893, L.14 - p.895, L.6.) Indeed, the district court ultimately instructed the
jurors that they could not even consider a necessity defense.

It instructed them as

follows:
Evidence of medical need has been admitted as it may be relevant
to contest the issue of intent to deliver, which is an element in the count
charging Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Deliver, by showing that
defendant possessed the marijuana only for his own personal use. Do not
consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for
which it is admitted.
(R., p.550; Tr. Vol. I, p.901, Ls.11-18.) Further exacerbating this problem, in her closing
argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that this case "is not about whether
marijuana is a good way or legitimate way to treat medical issues." (Tr. Vol. I, p.909,
Ls.1-3.)
Ultimately, on June 19, 2008, the jury in the First Case found Mr. Beavers guilty
of trafficking for possessing between five and 25 pounds of marijuana, 6 and of
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.562-63; Tr. Vol. /, p.961, L.2 p.963, L.16.) Mr. Beavers would not be sentenced in the First Case until much later.
*****

In the meantime, on November 20, 2007, while Mr. Beavers was apparently out
of jail on bond awaiting his trial in the First Case, the police were able to use a
confidential informant7 to set up a controlled buy between Mr. Beavers and an
6

The jury acquitted Mr. Beavers on the greater charge that he had possessed more
than 25 pounds of marijuana (R.,p.562), and it never reached the question of whether
Mr. Beavers committed the lesser offense of possessing between 25 and 50 marijuana
~lants (R., p.563).
The confidential informant was Catherine Johnson, a woman that Mr. Beavers knew
from her volunteer work with The Hemp and Cannabis Foundation (hereinafter, THCF),
a "health and wellness support group for medical marijuana patients" where those
patients can "exchange medical information" and obtain "safe access, to network with
each other to help them get their medicine." (Tr. Vol. VI, p.6, L.6 - p.7, L.5.) THCF is

a

undercover detective posing as someone with a medical need for marijuana.

(See

R, p.276; Tr. Vol. VI, p.23, L.1 - p.24, L.11.) The controlled marijuana buy occurred the
following day and, immediately afterward, Mr. Beavers was arrested and his car
searched. (R., p.276.) In the search of Mr. Beavers' vehicle, police found marijuana in
a suitcase in his trunk.

(R., p.276.)

Police then obtained a new search warrant for

Mr. Beavers' home and, in executing that warrant, located additional marijuana plants
on Mr. Beavers' property. (R., pp.276-77.)
Based on the events of November 21, 2007, Mr. Beavers was initially charged, in
Kootenai County Case No. CR-07-27416 (hereinafter, Second Case), with one count of
delivery of a controlled substance (marijuana) and one count of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.271-72.) However, it
was not long before the State filed an amended complaint adding a third count:
trafficking in marijuana (for possessing more than 25 marijuana plants). (R., pp.299300.)
On December 21, 2007, following a contested preliminary hearing where
Mr. Beavers was ultimately bound over on all three charged offenses (see R., p.326),
the State filed its Information. (R., pp.327-29.) Included in that Information were a host
of alleged sentencing enhancements, particularly described as follows:
•

In Part II, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at I.C. § 372739 (which would allow for sentences up to twice the sentences

based in Portland, Oregon, but it holds a clinic once per month in Spokane,
Washington. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.80, Ls.10-25.) Notably, after meeting with Dr. Thomas
Orville, M.D., a licensed physician, at THCF, Mr. Beavers received authorization to use
marijuana for medicinal purposes (in the State of Washington). (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.21 p.80, L.25; Defendant's Exhibit B.)
9

otherwise authorized on all three counts), alleging that Mr. Beavers "has
previously committed a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
and/or a violation of an Idaho [drug] statute .... " (R., p.328 (emphasis
added).)
•

In Part Ill, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at
J.C.§ 37-2739A (which would call for a mandatory minimum three-year
fixed

consecutive sentence on the delivery charge), alleging that

Mr. Beavers "has within the last ten (1 O years committed one or more
felony offenses of dealing, selling, or trafficking in controlled substances ..
. ." (R., pp.328-29 (emphasis added).)

•

In Part IV, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at
I.C. § 37-2732(B)(a)(7)8 (which would call for a mandatory minimum
sentence twice that which was otherwise required on the trafficking
charge), alleging that Mr. Beavers "has previously committed a trafficking
offense .... " (R., p.329 (emphasis added).)

•

In Part V, the State pied the sentencing enhancement codified at
I.C. § 19-2514 (which would call for minimum sentences of five years, and
in increase in the maximum punishments to life, for all three counts),

8

The State's original Information, as well as the subsequent Amended Information,
cited LC. § 37-2739B(a)(7) for the sentence enhancement alleged in Part IV. ( See
R., pp.329 (original Information), 588 (Amended Information).) However, there is no
section 37-2739B(a)(7) in the Idaho Code. Apparently this was a typographical error on
the State's part. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.213, L.5 - p.214, L.4.) Accordingly, near the end of
Mr. Beavers' trial in the Second Case, the district court granted the State leave to
amend the information to state the correct code section: LC. § 37-2732B(a)(7). (Tr. Vol.
VI, p.218, Ls.1-4, 19-24.)

10

alleging that has "been previously charged with at least two (2) separate
felony offenses" and, thus, is a "persistent violator" under Idaho law.
(R., p.329 (emphasis added).)
Notably, all four of the enhancements charged in the State's December 21, 2007
Information in the Second Case were based on the offenses alleged in the First Case,
which the State acknowledged was "still pending," and for which Mr. Beavers' trial was
still nearly six months away. (R., pp.328-29.)
On October 28, 2008, the first day of trial, the State filed an Amended
lnformation. 9 (R., pp.586-89.)

It appears that the only change made was that, with

regard to each of the four sentencing enhancements pied, the State removed the words
"still pending" from the references to alleged prior offenses (because, of course, by this
time, the trial had finally occurred in the First Case, even if Mr. Beavers had not yet
been sentenced and no formal judgment of conviction had been entered). (Compare
R., pp.327-29 (original Information) with R., pp.586-89 (Amended Information).)
In the meantime, on October 27, 2008, the day before Mr. Beavers' trial was set
to begin, the State had filed a motion in limine, identical that which it had filed in the
First Case, asking the district court to preclude Mr. Beavers from offering any evidence
concerning his need to use marijuana for medicinal reasons. (R., pp.576-77; see also
R., pp.580-83 (supporting memorandum).) The State's motion was based upon Idaho
Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. (R., p.577.) Particularly, the State argued that
the evidence in question was not relevant because "medical necessity/authorization is
not a defense to the charged offenses" of delivery, possession with intent to deliver, and
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trafficking (R., pp.581-82), and that it was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading
"because such evidence would give a jury the impression that it could somehow
consider such evidence in reaching a determination on Defendant's guilt, when a jury
clearly can not .... " (R., p.582.) Alternatively, the State argued, even if a necessity
defense was available to Mr. Beavers, he could not (in the State's view, and in the view
of the judge who presided over the trial in the First Case) satisfy the elements of the
defense and, therefore, he should not even be allowed to try in this case. (R., pp.58283.)
On the morning of the first day of trial in the Second Case, the district court 10
discussed the State's motion in limine.

(See Tr. Vol. V, p.83, L.13 - p.93, L.12.)

It

indicated that, if the defense could meet its burden of production with regard to the
necessity defense, it would allow the defense's evidence to be heard by the jury and it
would instruct the jury on that defense; however, if the defense could not meet its
burden of production, it would not even allow the defense to present its evidence to the
jury, as that evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible at that point.

(Tr. Vol. V,

p.83, L.13 - p.84, L.5, p.85, Ls.13-18.) The district court further indicated that, in order
to determine whether the defense could meet its burden of production, it would allow the
defense to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. (Tr. Vol. V, p.84,
Ls.6-12, p.84, L.19 - 85, L.1.)

9

It does not appear that the State ever sought, or received, leave of the district court to
file its Amended Information on October 28, 2008. (See general/y R.)
10
A different district court judge presided over Mr. Beavers' trial in the Second Case
than had presided over his trial in the First Case.
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In accordance with the forgoing plan, on the second day of trial, after the State
had rested its case-in-chief, the district court took up the matter of whether Mr. Beavers
would be allowed to present a defense. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.65, L.16 - p.132, L.21.) At
the outset, the district court again explained that, unless the defense would be entitled
to a necessity instruction, it would not be allowed to present any evidence as to
Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana because that evidence would be "irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial, it would lead to the confusion of issues, it would mislead the
jury, [and] be a waste of the jury's time."

(Tr. Vol. VI, p.65, L.20 - p.66, L.8.)

Thereafter, the district court heard the defense's offer of proof (in the form of sworn
testimony from Mr. Beavers). (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.1 - p.120, L.5.) Mr. Beavers'
testimony was very consistent with his testimony in the First Case. He testified about
his various medical conditions (irritable bowel syndrome, internal hemorrhoids, Hepatitis
B and C, hypertension, anxiety, depression, and angina attacks) and the symptoms
associated with some of those conditions (anal bleeding and discharge, bowel
discomfort, constipation, and severe headaches) (Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.1,
p.73, Ls.10-17, p.84, L.24 - p.85, L.7); he testified that his medical problems had had a
tremendous impact on his life (Tr. Vol. VI, p.84, Ls.1-12); he testified that he was
eventually granted authorization by the State of Washington to use marijuana for
medicinal purposes (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.4 - p.80, L.20); and he testified that the use of
marijuana, especially combined with an improved diet and a regimen of exercise, yoga,
and meditation, alleviates his symptoms and allows him to function again. (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.83, Ls.16-25, p.85, L.21 - p.86, L.16, p.93, Ls.2-25, p.95, Ls.14-20, p.97, Ls.18-19,
p.98, Ls.8-15). Mr. Beavers further testified that he had no health insurance (Tr. Vol. VI,
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p.81, Ls.7-8), generally could not afford to see specialists or pay for emergency room
visits (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, L.9 - p.82, L.23), and, when he did eventually seek
traditional medical care for his condition, he received a medication that helped, but
brought on a significant side effect (angina) that caused him to have to stop taking that
medication. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.75, L.24 - p.79, L.5.)
Following the defense's offer of proof, the district court heard arguments as to
whether Mr. Beavers' testimony would warrant a jury instruction on the defense of
necessity and, if not, whether Mr. Beavers would be allowed to testify at all regarding
his medical need for marijuana. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.120, L.14 - p.132, L.21.) Ultimately,
the district court decided that it would not be instructing the jury on the defense of
necessity and, thus, Mr. Beavers could not even present to the jury his testimony
concerning his medical need for marijuana. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.7 - p.132, L.21.) It
reasoned as follows:
[l]t's my opinion that ... there's an absence of evidence that the
defendant lacked adequate legal medical alternatives to the use of
marijuana, that there's no reasonable evidence of any specific threat of
any immediate harm to the defendant, that there's no reasonable evidence
that the defendant could have prevented the threatened harm by any less
offensive alternative such as the reasonable pursuit of medical attention,
which I don't find he engaged in.
. . . . [l]n my opinion, any-I don't believe he reasonably pursued
medical attention for the complaints he has. Certainly had he done so, he
very well may have been able to receive legally prescribed medication for
any psychological problem such as depression or anxiety or any medical
condition that he complained of such as high blood pressure.
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the defense that,
based upon the amount seized from the defendant an the number of
plants involved and the fact that he was actually selling marijuana, that the
harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm.
Certainly it's difficult to belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own
use when, at the same-if, at the same time as the evidence clearly
shows, he was selling marijuana.
14

So after having considered all the evidence submitted by the State
during the trial as well as the evidence submitted by the defendant outside
the presence of the jury, its my determination that there's no-that, in fact,
no reasonable view of the evidence would support the giving of the
instruction on [the] common law defense of necessity.
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.8- p.132, L.21.)
In light of the district court's ruling, Mr. Beavers had virtually nothing to present in
his own defense (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.134, L.1 - p.138, L.6 (Mr. Beavers' exceptionally
brief direct testimony)), and the defense quickly rested. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.147, Ls.2223.)
At the final jury instruction conference, defense counsel lodged one final
objection to the district court's refusal to allow Mr. Beavers to present his defense or
have the jury instructed on the defense of necessity: 'The necessity instruction. We
have asked the Court to give that instruction.

We object on the grounds of the

deprivation of my client for a full and fair trial to present a full and vigorous defense on
his behalf, and we would ask the Court to give the necessity instruction." (Tr. Vol. VI,
p.155, Ls.5-10.)

However, the district court was still not swayed, as it its final

instructions to the jury contained no mention of the defense of necessity.

(See

R., pp.628-53.)
In light of all of this, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three alleged offenses.

(R., pp.655-56; Tr. Vol. VI, p.220, L.24 - p.221, L.23.) Thereafter, Mr. Beavers waived
his right to a jury trial as to Parts II, Ill, and IV of the Amended lnformation, 11 and
conditionally admitted the fact underlying the sentencing enhancements pied in those
three parts of the Information, i.e., the fact that he had been found guilty of both

11

The State dismissed the "persistent violator" enhancement pied in Part V of the
Information. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.228, Ls.23-24, p.232, Ls.15-19.)
15

trafficking in marijuana, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, in the
First Case. (See Tr. Vol. VI, p.223, L.17 - p.233, L.17.) Although he admitted that fact
that he had been found guilty in the First Case, Mr. Beavers specifically preserved his
right to argue, as a legal matter, that the verdicts in the First Case could not be used to
enhance his sentences in the Second Case. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.224, L.24 - p.225, L.6.)
*****

The First Case and the Second Case were consolidated for purposes of
sentencing.

January 21, 2009 was the original setting for that sentencing hearing;

however the State requested a continuance so as to have time to submit a sentencing
memorandum setting forth its arguments concerning how the charged enhancements
ought to apply.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.984, Ls.1 - p.985, L.12)

Ultimately, the district court

granted the State's request, observing that it could use some input from the parties in
light of the fact that "the sentencing issues, as far as I can see on this case, it would
maybe understate the situation to say it is complex." (Tr. Vol. I, p.987, Ls.1-12, p.987,
L.25 - p.988, L.5.)
Two days later, on January 23, 2009, the State filed its sentencing memorandum.
(R., pp.661-66.) In that memorandum, the State argued that Mr. Beavers' sentences in
the Second Case were properly enhanced based on the jury's verdicts in the First Case
because those verdicts constituted a prior "conviction." (R., pp.664-65.) In addition, the
State presented arguments as to how it believed the various enhancements should
apply. (R., pp.662-65.)
On January 29, 2009, Mr. Beavers filed his responsive sentencing memorandum.
(R., pp.667-70.)

In that memorandum, Mr. Beavers argued primarily that the guilty
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verdicts in the First Case could not be used to enhance the sentences in the Second
Case. (R., pp.667-70.) Mr. Beavers explained that, at the relevant time-the time when
he allegedly committed the offenses charged in the Second Case-he had not
previously been convicted of the drug crimes in question because he had not yet been
sentenced for, or even found guilty of, those offenses. (R., pp.668-70.)
The next day, the district court held a lengthy sentencing hearing. ( See generally
Tr. Vol. I, p.997, L.1 - p.1076, L.7.) During the first phase of that hearing, the district
court discussed, and heard arguments on, the law with regard to: the base sentences
for the charged offenses; the question of whether those sentences could (or must) be
enhanced under the facts of these cases; and, assuming the enhancements apply, how
those enhancements would affect the base sentences.

(See Tr. Vol. I, p.997, L.1 -

p.1025, L.10.) With regard to the question of whether the jury's verdicts in the First
Case could (or must) be used to enhance the sentences imposed in the Second Case,
the district court ultimately ruled that the enhancements apply. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1024, L.3 p.1025, L.10.)
During the second phase of the January 20, 2009 sentencing hearing, the district
court went over corrections to the PSI, listened to Mr. Beavers' allocution, took
arguments from the parties' counsel, and, ultimately, imposed the following sentences:
•

Trafficking by possessing between 5 and 25 pounds of marijuana (in the
First Case): six years, with three years fixed;

•

Possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver (in the First Case): five
years, with one year fixed, concurrent;
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•

Delivery of marijuana (in the Second Case): Five years, with two years
fixed, concurrent;

•

Possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver (in the Second Case):
Five years, with two years fixed, concurrent; and

•

Trafficking by possessing up to 25 marijuana plants (in the Second Case):
Twelve years, with two years fixed, concurrent.

(R., pp.681-82; Tr. Vol. I, p.1072, L.2 - p .1073, L.4.) Thus, Mr. Beavers' aggregate
sentence is twelve years, with three years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, Ls.7-10, p.1072,
Ls.3-5.)
On February 4, 2009, the district court entered a judgment of conviction bearing
the case numbers of both the First Case and the Second Case. (R., pp.680-83.) Just
over a week later, on February 13, 2009, Mr. Beavers timely filed notices of appeal in
both cases.12

(R., pp.689-91 (Notice of Appeal in Second Case); Notice of Appeal,

Kootenai County No. CR-06-18813 (Feb. 13, 2009) (Notice of Appeal in First Case). 13)
On appeal, Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the First Case by failing

12

On March 6, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the
appeals of the First Case and the Second Case.
1
Undersigned counsel is currently in possession of an un-file-stamped copy of the
Notice of Appeal in the First Case and, based on the district court's Register of Actions
from the First Case, believes that a copy of that document was, in fact, filed with the
district court on February 13, 2009. Undersigned counsel has been attempting to obtain
a filed-stamped copy of said Notice or Appeal (which could then be attached to a motion
to augment the Record on Appeal) from the district court but, as of the filing of this
Appellant's Brief, has not yet received it. When a file-stamped copy of the Notice of
Appeal is provided to undersigned counsel, Mr. Beavers will file a motion to augment
the Record on Appeal with that document attached. If, however, the district court is
unable, or unwilling, to provide the requested Notice of Appeal within a reasonable time,
Mr. Beavers will file a motion to augment the Record on Appeal without the document
attached, and will ask the Supreme Court to order the district court to provide that
document.
18

to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity; it erred in the Second Case
by refusing to allow Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered
necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense; and it erred at
the joint sentencing hearing by enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case
based on its finding that he had been previously convicted of certain drug offenses in
the First Case.

19

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by refusing to instruct the jury
on the affirmative defense of necessity?

2.

Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by refusing to allow
Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered necessity defense,
and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense?

3.

Did the district court err at Mr. Beaver's joint sentencing hearing by enhancing
Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based on its finding that he had
been previously convicted of certain drug offenses in the First Case?
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ARGUMENT

I.
In Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On
The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity
A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in denying his request that the

jury in the First Case be instructed that, even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed
marijuana, it could find him not guilty on the basis of the common law defense of
necessity based on the fact that his use of marijuana was necessary lo treat his medical
condition. He asserts that he met his burden of production as lo the four elements of
the defense by offering evidence that: (1) he faced a specific threat of immediate harm,

i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal condition; (2) his gastrointestinal condition was not a
product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from his gastrointestinal
condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm caused by using
marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering avoided.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
In State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), the Idaho Supreme

Court held that the common law defense of necessity is available to defendants
claiming that they possessed and ingested marijuana for medicinal purposes.

Id. at

854-55, 801 P.2d at 563-64. In Hastings, the Court outlined the four elements of the
necessity defense:
1.

A specific threat of immediate harm;

2.

The circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have
been brought about by the defendant;
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3.

The same objective could not have been accomplished by a less
offensive alternative available to the actor;

4.

The harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.

Id. at 855, 801 P.2d at 564.
As with any defense in Idaho, the defendant asserting a necessity defense bears
"[t]he burden of production, i.e., [the burden] of raising a prima facie defense .... "

State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 & n.2, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 & n.2 (Ct. App. 2000).
In other words, the defendant bears the burden of producing such evidence that "a
reasonable view of the record support[s] the elements of his affirmative defense[] .... "

Id. at 656-665-66, 8 P.3d at 660-61. The defendant, however, does not bear the burden
of persuasion; once he has satisfied his burden of production, it is incumbent upon the
State to disprove (under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) his defense. 14 See
I.C.J. I. 1512 (pattern jury instruction for the necessity defense, providing that "[t]he state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because of
necessity"); cf State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 & n.1, 673 P.2d 416,417 & n.1
(1983) (calling a jury instruction a correct statement of the law of entrapment where it
indicated that it was the State's burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant's claim of entrapment).

14

The burden of proof applicable to defenses in criminal cases is discussed in detail in
the commentary provided with I.C.J.I. 1500. In that commentary, the Committee looks
back more than 100 years, tracing the development of the law with respect to
"affirmative" defenses, and opines that the mere fact that defenses in Idaho have
traditionally been called "affirmative" defenses, "the general rule in Idaho is that the
defendant in a criminal case has the burden of producing evidence regarding any
defense, but he does not have the burden of persuasion. Once the defense is properly
raised, the state must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt." I.C.J.I. 1500 cmt.
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With regard to the question of when the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction
on his proffered necessity defense, it is well-settled that the applicable standard is
couched in terms that are substantially the same as those used to describe his burden
of production: "[a] defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have a legal theory of
defense submitted to the jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the
evidence that would support the theory." State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414, 34 P.3d
1096, 1097 (Ct. App. 2001); accord State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878-79, 920 P.2d
391, 395-96 (1996). Thus, it is clear that the defendant seeking to place a necessity
defense before the jury must present a prima facie case of necessity, i.e., he must
present sufficient facts such that there is a "reasonable view" of the evidence to support
the elements of the defense; however, the defendant has no obligation to overcome the
State's evidence.
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has said that "[t]he question of whether there
is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports an instruction to the jury on the
defense of necessity is [a] matter of discretion for the district court," Howley, 128 Idaho
at 878, 920 P.2d at 395, this discretionary standard, and its attendant "abuse of
discretion" standard on review, see id. at 879, 920 P.2d at 396, appears to be a
misnomer.

The question of whether a party has presented a prima facie case is

typically judged under an objective standard and, thus, is typically considered to be a
question of law, subject to de nova review. See, e.g., State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
461, 988 P.2d 685, 687 (1999) (holding that the denial of a motion for acquittal is
reviewed de nova); Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 650-51, 448 P.2d 653, 656-57
(1968) (holding that a motion for dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(6), which implicates the
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question of whether the plaintiff met his burden of presenting a prima facie case,
presents a question of law). Thus, it would seem that the Court of Appeals was correct
when it held that "[w]hether proffered evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie
showing of an affirmative [necessity] defense is a question of law which we freely
review." State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 321, 882 P.2d 974, 976 (Ct. App. 1994).
This makes sense, of course, because the question of whether a jury was properly
instructed on the law is generally considered a legal question, subject to de nova review
on appeal. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 461, 988 P .2d at 687 ("The question of whether the
jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review.") Accordingly, the language of Howley notwithstanding, Mr. Beavers' claim that
the district court erred in denying his requested necessity defense instruction should be
reviewed de nova by this Court.

C.

Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Should Have
Instructed The Jury On The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity
Taking an objectively reasonable view of the evidence presented by the defense

in this case, it is clear that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden of production as to the four
elements of the common law defense of necessity. Therefore, it was legal error for the
district court to have declined to instruct the jury as to the availability and elements of
that defense.

1.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition

As noted above, during the trial in the First Case, Mr. Beavers offered extensive
testimony concerning his health problems.

Mr. Beavers testified that, approximately

twelve years earlier, he began suffering acute gastrointestinal distress, "having pain and
24

discomfort in the rectal area" and "passing blood and some kind of fluid." (Tr. Vol. I,
p.791, L.17- p.792, L.1.) He further testified that this condition worsened to where he
became incontinent and had to begin wearing a diaper, and that the incontinence grew
to become a daily occurrence.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.792, L.2 - p.793, L.4.)

Mr. Beavers

indicated that, as his gastrointestinal problems worsened, he also developed frequent,
severe headaches. (Tr. Vol. I, p.792, Ls.4-11.) Eventually, Mr. Beavers began suffer
fatigue and depression as well. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, Ls.16-20.) Mr. Beavers testified that
his cramps, aches, and pains quickly became debilitating, such that he was unable to
work. (Tr. Vol. I, p.793, L.13 - p.794, L.5.)
Surely, abdominal pain, coupled with ongoing rectal bleeding and severe
headaches, all of which causes the sufferer to be completely incapacitated, is a "threat
of immediate harm" within the meaning of Hastings. Indeed, the State never questioned
Mr. Beavers' claim that his gastrointestinal condition constituted a "threat of immediate
harm" (see R., pp.258-59 (State's motion in limine); Tr. Vol. I, p.124, L.4 - p.126, L.12
(State's arguments at the hearing on its motion in limine), p.132, L.2 - p.133, L.5
(same); (Tr. Vol. I, p.779, L.8 - p.780, L.20 (State's argument at trial seeking to
preclude Mr. Beavers from testifying about his medical condition), p.783, L.15 - p.785,
L.8 (same)), and the district court impliedly found that Mr. Beavers' gastrointestinal
condition did constitute a "threat of immediate harm" (see Tr. Vol. I, p.893, L.14 - p.895,
L.6 (finding that Mr. Beavers was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of
necessity because he failed to explain how the quantity of marijuana allegedly found
was necessary to remedy his condition)).
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2.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana

Since the "specific threat of immediate harm" at issue in this case is Mr. Beavers"
illness. it is obviously not something that he brought about on his own.

3.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e.,
A Modest Recovery, Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less
Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was Actually
Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him

For purposes of this case, the most critical element of the necessity defense is
the requirement that the same objective could not have been accomplished by any less
offensive alternatives that were actually available. Thus. in the context of this case, the
operative question becomes whether Mr. Beavers could have satisfactorily treated his
gastrointestinal condition through conventional medicine.
Keeping in mind that Mr. Beavers' burden was only to produce evidence on this
point. not to persuade the finder of fact, he submits that he met his burden by
presenting prima facie evidence that he had no choice but to use marijuana to treat his
gastrointestinal condition.

As noted, Mr. Beavers testified that he did not seek

professional medical care for his symptoms because he had no medical insurance and
could not afford to pay for medical care out of his own pocket. (Tr. Vol. I, p.794, L.20 p.795. L.6, p.798, Ls.6-16.)

Accordingly, Mr. Beavers was forced to take a holistic,

naturopathic approach to dealing with his health.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.795, Ls.7-20.)

He

improved his diet by giving up prepared foods in favor of home-cooked meals prepared
with organic ingredients and containing more fruits and vegetables; he started doing
yoga and meditating; and he began exercising regularly. (Tr. Vol. I. p.795. L.21 - p.796,
L.25.) While these measures, undoubtedly helped Mr. Beavers, they did not cure him.
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.797, Ls.1-4.)

Thus, after months of research and self-study, he began

growing marijuana to use as medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.797, L.5 - p.799, L.4.) Initially,
Mr. Beavers smoked the marijuana he grew; however, as his research progressed, he
came to believe that his health problems could be better managed by also integrating
marijuana into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.12-19.) He learned that the "bud material
[from the marijuana plant] is really more appropriately smoked," and that the leaf
material (the "shake") "has its best medicinal effect when you process it and you put it in
the food and eat it." (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.5-15.) Furthermore, because the "the effects
[of these alternative means of ingestion] are very different" (Tr. Vol. I, p.805, Ls.14-15),
and they affected Mr. Beavers' various symptoms in different ways, Mr. Beavers used
both methods of ingestion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.807, L.19 - p.808, L.4.) Mr. Beavers testified
that this holistic, naturopathic approach to his medical condition seemed to work, as his
dietary changes, .exercise, and use of marijuana coincided with an improvement in his
condition. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.16- p.856, L.7.)
Although the district court concluded that Mr. Beavers was not entitled to a
necessity instruction "because of the uncontroverted evidence with regard to the
amounts" at issue, the district court's focus was misplaced. First, the amounts at issue
were not "uncontroverted"; in fact, in his own testimony, Mr. Beavers challenged the
State's claim that he possessed more than 25 pounds of marijuana. (Tr. Vol. I, p.822,
L.23 - p.823, L.823, L.6, p.841, L.20 - p.842, L.3.)

(And, indeed, the jury ultimately

found that he possessed less than the 25 pounds alleged by the State. (R., pp.56263.)) Second, and more importantly, the district court's comments make it clear that it
was improperly weighing Mr. Beavers' testimony against the State's evidence and

27

concluding that Mr. Beavers' story simply was not credible. In essence then, the district
court's ruling was based on its erroneously placing the burden of persuasion on
Mr. Beavers.

Had the district court applied the correct standard-the production of

evidence standard-it would have had to have concluded that Mr. Beavers' presented
prima facie evidence that he could not have treated his illness without marijuana, and it

would have been up to the jury to decide whether that evidence was credible.

4.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The
Harm Caused, i.e .• Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided. i.e .. Mr. Beavers· Continued
Suffering And Incapacitation

Although the State can undoubtedly argue some sort of theoretical "societal
harm" argument to try to justify the criminalization of the growing, possession, and use
of marijuana, the fact is that, in this case, there is simply no evidence of anyone having
actually been harmed by Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana. Moreover, given the
harm avoided-Mr. Beavers' continued suffering and incapacitation-it simply cannot
be said that the societal harm (assuming there is some) is disproportionate to the
suffering that Mr. Beavers avoided.

II.

The District Court Erred In Mr. Beavers' Second Case By Refusing To Allow
Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense, And
By Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense

A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the Second Case by denying

him the opportunity to present evidence concerning his health conditions and his
medical need for marijuana, and in declining to instruct the jury that, even if it found that
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Mr. Beavers possessed marijuana, it could nevertheless find him not guilty of trafficking
based on the common law defense of necessity because his use of marijuana was
necessary to treat his medical condition.

He asserts that he met his burden of

production as to the four elements of the defense by offering evidence that:

(1) he

faced a specific threat of immediate harm, i.e., debilitating illness; (2) his medical
condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from
his medical condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm
caused by using marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering avoided.
B.

Applicable Legal Standards
As discussed in Part 1.8, above, the common law defense of necessity is

available to defendants claiming that they possessed and ingested marijuana for
medicinal purposes, Hastings, 118 Idaho at 854-55, 801 P.2d at 563-64; however, the
defendant bears the burden of production, such that he is not entitled to a jury
instruction on his proffered necessity defense unless he has presented prima facie
evidence of necessity, see Howley, 128 Idaho at 878-79, 920 P.2d at 395-96.
Just as was done by the district court in Mr. Beavers' Second Case, some of the
Idaho decisions addressing defendants' requests for jury instructions on the necessity
defense have blended the jury instruction issue with the question of whether the
defendant can even present his necessity defense. See, e.g., Howley, 128 Idaho 874,
920 P.2d 391; State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 882 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994). The
theory behind this approach, it would seem, is that, if the defendant cannot produce
sufficient evidence of his necessity theory to warrant a jury instruction, any evidence on
that topic would be irrelevant.

Chisholm, 126 Idaho at 322-23, 882 P.2d at 977-78.
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Moreover. this blended approach makes a certain amount of sense given that both
questions (whether evidence concerning the defense can be presented and whether the
jury can be instructed) seem to call for the same inquiry: whether the defendant has
presented prima facie evidence as to the four elements of the necessity defense. See

Tadlock. 136 Idaho at 414. 34 P.3d at 1097; Howley, 128 Idaho at 878-79, 920 P.2d at
395-96. Chisholm. 126 Idaho at 322-23. 882 P.2d at 977-78.
As with the more narrow question of whether the defendant has presented prima

facie evidence entitling him to a jury instruction on the necessity defense. the blended
question of whether he is entitled to present that defense and receive a jury instruction
on that defense. involves a question of law which Mr. Beavers submits is subject to de

nova review.

See Part I.B. supra (arguing that the question of whether a party has

presented a prima facie case is typically judged under an objective standard and, thus,
is typically considered to be a question of law, subject to de novo review); see also

State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,228, 178 P.3d 28. 31 (2008) ("The question of whether
evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to admit relevant evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
C.

Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers· Second Case. The District Court Should Have
Allowed Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence Relating To The Affirmative Defense
Of Necessity, And It Should Have Instructed The Jury About That Defense
Taking an objectively reasonable view of the evidence presented by the defense

in the Second Case. it is clear that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden of production as to
the four elements of the common law defense of necessity. Therefore. it was legal error
for the district court to have precluded him from testifying as to his medical need for
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marijuana, and to have declined to instruct the jury as to the availability and elements of
the necessity defense.

1.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition

As he had while testifying in front of the jury in the First Case, during his offer of
proof in the Second Case Mr. Beavers testified about his various medical conditions
(irritable bowel syndrome, internal hemorrhoids, Hepatitis B and C, hypertension,
anxiety, depression, and angina attacks) and the symptoms associated with some of
those conditions (anal bleeding and discharge, bowel discomfort, constipation, and
severe headaches). (Tr. Vol. VI, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.1, p.73, Ls.10-17, p.84, L.24 p.85, L.7 .)

Furthermore, Mr. Beavers testified that his medical problems had had a

tremendously negative impact on his life. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.84, Ls.1-12.)
Surely Mr. Beavers' illnesses and their attendant symptoms, all of which had a
profound impact on his life, constitute a "threat of immediate harm" within the meaning
of Hastings.

Indeed, the district court impliedly found that Mr. Beavers' health

conditions did constitute a "threat of immediate harm" (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.131, L.8 p.132, L.21) (concluding that Mr. Beavers would not be allowed to present his defense,
and was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of necessity, because he failed to
establish that he went to reasonable lengths to pursue medical attention before turning
to marijuana and because, based on the State's evidence, the district court simply did
not believe that Mr. Beavers was growing marijuana solely to remedy his own health
problems)).
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2.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His
Illegal Act, i.e .. His Possession And Use Of Marijuana

Just as with the First Case, since the "specific threat of immediate harm" at issue
in the Second Case was Mr. Beavers' illness, it was obviously not something that he
brought about on his own.

3.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective. i.e.,
A Modest Recovery, Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less
Offensive Alternative. e.g.. Traditional Medicine, That Was Actually
Available, i.e .. Affordable. To Him

As with the First Case, the most critical element of the necessity defense with
regard to the Second Case is the requirement that the same objective could not have
been accomplished by any less offensive alternatives that were actually available to
Mr. Beavers. Thus, the operative question becomes whether Mr. Beavers could have
satisfactorily treated his gastrointestinal condition through conventional medicine.
Keeping in mind that Mr. Beavers' burden was only to produce evidence on this
point, not to persuade the finder of fact, he submits that he met his burden by
presenting prima facie evidence that he had no choice but to use marijuana to treat his
gastrointestinal condition. As noted, in his offer of proof, Mr. Beavers testified that he
had no health insurance (Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, Ls.7-8), he generally could not afford to see
specialists or pay for emergency room visits (see Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, L.9 - p.82, L.23),
and, when he did eventually seek traditional medical care for his condition, he received
a medication that helped, but brought on a significant side effect (angina) that caused
him to have to stop taking that medication. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.75, L.24 - p.79, L.5.) He
further testified that he was eventually granted authorization by the State of Washington
to use marijuana for medicinal purposes (Tr. Vol. VI, p.79, L.4 - p.80, L.20), and that the
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use of marijuana, especially when combined with an improved diet and a regimen of
exercise, yoga, and meditation, alleviated his symptoms and allowed him to function
again (Tr. Vol. VI, p.83, Ls.16-25, p.85, L.21 - p.86, L.16, p.93, Ls.2-25, p.95, Ls.14-20,
p.97, Ls.18-19, p.98, Ls.8-15).
The district court concluded that Mr. Beavers would not be allowed to testify
about his illnesses and his medical need for marijuana, and that he was not entitled to a
jury instruction on the defense of necessity, because he failed to establish that he went
to reasonable lengths to pursue medical attention before turning to marijuana and
because, based on the State's evidence, the district court simply did not believe that
Mr. Beavers was growing marijuana solely to remedy his own health problems. (Tr. Vol.
VI, p.131, L.8 - p.132, L.21.)

This ruling, however, was incorrect.

First, as noted

above, Mr. Beavers testified that he could not afford to go to the doctor initially and,
when he did eventually go, the conventional remedy provided was no remedy at all
because it came with significant side effects. This was sufficient to satisfy Mr. Beavers'
burden of production, even if it did not persuade the district court.
Second, insofar as the district court simply did not believe Mr. Beavers'
testimony, as noted above in Part I.C.3, this type of weighing of the evidence is
inconsistent the applicable legal standard, whereby only the burden of production, not
the burden of persuasion, was on Mr. Beavers. Moreover, a district court simply cannot
weigh the perceived strength of the State's evidence in determining whether the
defendant ought to be allowed to present evidence in his defense. Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006).
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Had the district court applied the correct standard-the production of evidence
standard-it would have had to have concluded that Mr. Beavers' presented prima facie
evidence that he could not have treated his illness without marijuana, and it would have
been up to the jury to decide whether that evidence was credible.

4.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued
Suffering And Incapacitation

Again, although the State can come up with a theoretical "societal harm"
argument to try to justify the criminalization of the growing, possession, and use of
marijuana, the fact is that, in this case, there is simply no evidence of anyone having
actually been harmed by Mr. Beavers' medicinal use of marijuana. Moreover, given the
harm avoided-Mr. Beavers' continued suffering and incapacitation-it cannot be said
that the societal harm (assuming there is some) is disproportionate to the suffering that
Mr. Beavers avoided.
The district court weighed the State's evidence heavily in finding that the harm
caused was disproportionate to the harm avoided:
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the defense that,
based upon the amount seized from the defendant and the number of
plants involved and the fact that he was actually selling marijuana, that the
harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm.
Certainly it's difficult to belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own
use when, at the same-if, at the same time as the evidence clearly
shows, he was selling marijuana.
(Tr. Vol. VI, p.132, Ls.6-14.) However, as noted, the standard for determining whether
Mr. Beavers had a right to present his necessity defense and was entitled to a jury
instruction on the common law defense of necessity, did not call for the district court to
weigh the evidence and base its decision on whether it thought Mr. Beavers was guilty.
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See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 329-31. The correct standard was simply determining whether
Mr. Beavers presented prima facie evidence. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 &
n.2, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 & n.2 (Ct. App. 2000). Clearly, he did.

111.
The District Court Erred At Mr. Beaver's Joint Sentencing Hearing By Enhancing
Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Based On Its Finding That He Had Been
Previously Convicted Of Certain Drug Offenses In The First Case
A.

Introduction
In the Second Case, the State pied four sentencing enhancements based on the

allegation that Mr. Beavers had previously "committed" the drug crimes charged in the
First Case.

(R., pp.327-29 (original Information) (emphasis added), pp.596-89

(Amended Information) (emphasis added).) At the time that the original Information was
filed, of course, the State could only allege that Mr. Beavers had "committed" the
previous drug crimes because, at that point, Mr. Beavers had not actually been
"convicted" of those crimes. (Compare R., pp.327-29 (December 21, 2007 Information
in the Second case) with R., pp.562-64 (June 19, 2008 verdict in the First Case).)
The State ultimately proceeded with three of the four enhancements originally
pied:
•

I.C. § 37-2739, which would allow for sentences up to twice the sentences
otherwise

authorized

on

all

three

counts

in

the

Second

Case.

Section 37-2739 applies to· "[a]ny person convicted of or subsequent
offense," and it specifically states that, "(f]or purposes of this section, an
offense is a second subsequent offense, if, prior to his conviction of the
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offense, the offender has at any time been convicted" of a drug offense.
Id. (emphasis added).

•

I.C. § 37-2739A, which would call for a mandatory minimum three-year
fixed consecutive sentence on the delivery charge.

Section 37-2739A

applies to anyone "who has previously been convicted within the last ten
(10) years" of any "dealing, selling, or trafficking" offense.

This

enhancement does not contain any kind of definition of what constitutes a
previous conviction. See id. (emphasis added).
•

I.C. § 37-2732(B)(a)(7), which would call for a mandatory minimum
sentence twice that which was otherwise required on the trafficking
charge.

Section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) applies to any "second conviction for

any trafficking offense .... " Id. (emphasis added).
(See Tr. Vol. VI, p.222, L.10 - p.229, L.2.) Eventually, the district court ruled that all
three of those enhancements could be applied in the Second Case because, by then,
Mr. Beavers had been found guilty, i.e., "convicted," in the First Case.

(Tr. Vol. I,

p.1024, L.3 - p.1025, L.8.) Apparently, the district court took the approach that the
foregoing enhancements apply so long as the "conviction," i.e., guilty verdict, for the first
offense(s) came about prior to the sentencing hearing for the second offense(s), without
regard as to whether the "conviction" for the first offense predated the commission of
the second offense. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1024, L.3- p.1025, L.8.)
Mr. Beavers submits that the district court's ruling was in error and that, in fact,
the enhancements pied by the State cannot apply in this case because, at the time
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Mr. Beavers committed the offenses alleged in the Second Case, he had no prior drug
convictions.

B.

Standard Or Review
The question of whether a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction

can be applied to a crime alleged to have been committed before the prior conviction
came about requires interpretation of the statute authorizing the enhancement. And,
since the interpretation of a statute raises a question of law, the district court's ruling in
this case is subject to de nova review. Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai
County, 147 Idaho 173, 176, 208 P.3d 149, 152 (2009).

C.

Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Could Not Be Enhanced Based On
His Prior Convictions In The First Case Because Those Prior Convictions Did Not
Exist At The Time That He Allegedly Committed The Offenses At Issue In The
Second Case
Each of the three statutory enhancements at issue in this appeal is predicated

upon the existence of a prior drug-related conviction.

I.C. §§ 37-2739, -2739A,

and -2732{B)(a)(7). Not one of these enhancements, however, is explicit as to what the
prior conviction must be prior to.

See I.C. §§ 37-2739, -2739A, and -2732(B)(a)(7).

Must it prior to the commission of the subsequent offense?

The filing of formal

charges? The guilty plea or jury verdict? The sentencing hearing? Or formal entry of
judgment?
In this case, the district court seems to have assumed that the prior conviction
need only have been prior to the sentencing hearing in the subsequent case.

(See

Tr. Vol. VI, p.1024, L.3- p.1025, L.10.) However, Mr. Beavers submits that the best
reading of the enhancement statutes at issue in this appeal is that they require that
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there have been one or more drug-related convictions prior to commission of the
subsequent offense. Thus, Mr. Beavers contends that even if we are to assume that he
was "convicted" of the offenses at issue in the First Case on June 19, 2008, the date the
jury rendered its verdict in that case (R., pp.562), 15 those convictions cannot be used to
enhance his sentences in the Second Case because those convictions did not exist on
November 21, 2007, the date on which Mr. Beavers allegedly committed the offenses at
issue in the Second Case.
Mr. Beavers' interpretation of the enhancement statutes is based on the idea that
all such enhancements are designed to punish recidivism; they are intended to impose
a harsher punishment on the defendant who, after having been previously convicted
(and typically punished) for his first drug crime and, thus, given a strong warning, failed
to learn his lesson and reform his behavior, and subsequently committed another drug
crime. This is certainly the purpose of Idaho's "persistent violator" enhancement statute
(I.C. § 19-2514), see State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 565, 990 P.2d 144, 146
(Ct. App. 1999); State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 339, 340, 971 P.2d 1161, 1163, 1164
(Ct. App. 1998); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App.
1986), and it would seem to be the purpose of the enhancements at issue in this
appeal.
Indeed, although it appears that the Idaho courts have not yet addressed the
precise question involved in this case-whether a recidivism statute providing for

15

Below, the State argued that under United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d
1059 (2008), a guilty plea or a jury finding of guilt constitutes a "conviction," even if the
defendant has not been sentenced and the district court has lodged no formal judgment
of conviction. (R., p.665.) The district court agreed with the State on this point. (See
Tr. Vol. VI, p.1024, Ls.3-18.)
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enhanced penalties based on prior convictions applies to situations where the
defendant was not actually convicted of the prior offense until after he committed the
present offense-"[t]he rule in most jurisdictions with enhanced penalty statutes is that
the prior conviction must precede the commission of the principal offense . . . ."
Gargliano v. State, 639 A.2d 675, 683 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original}. See,
e.g., State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630, 641 (Ak. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that under

Alaska's presumptive sentencing scheme, because the defendant committed three
separate felonies before he was convicted of any of them, all three had to be treated as
first convictions); State v. Ahakuelo, 683 P.2d 400, 403 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that an enhancement for a prior DUI conviction did not apply where the defendant
committed both DU ls before he was convicted of either); People v. Phillips, 502 N.E.2d
80, 81-82 (111. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986) (holding that an enhancement for a prior weapons
conviction did not apply where the defendant committed both weapons offenses before
he was convicted of either, and noting that "[a]n enhanced penalty should not be
imposed until the offender has had the opportunity to reform after being punished for his
first conviction"); State v. Osoba, 672 P.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Kan. 1983) (holding that
an enhancement for a prior DUI conviction did not apply where the defendant committed
both DU ls before he was convicted of either); Bray v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 478,
479-80 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement did not apply where
the defendant committed his third felony before he was convicted of his second felony,
and noting that the philosophy behind Kentucky's habitual offender statute is that "a
person who commits a felony after having been convicted of a felony has doubt cast on
his ability to be rehabilitated and that a person who commits a felony after having been
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convicted of a felony the second time may well be incorrigible and deserving of more
extended incarceration"); State v. Nicholas, 491 So.2d 711, 715 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1986) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement had not been proven to be
applicable because the government had failed to demonstrate the latest prior conviction
had actually occurred prior to the defendant's commission of the present offense);
Gargliano, 639 A.2d at 683 (holding that an enhancement for a prior drug convictions
did not apply where the defendant committed the principal (third) drug offense before he
was convicted of either of the previous two drug offenses); State v. Gehrke, 474 N.W.2d
722, 726 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a habitual offender enhancement did not apply where
the principal offense was committed while the defendant was out on bail awaiting trial
for the prior offense because the defendant was not yet convicted for the prior offense);
State v. Brezillac, 573 P.2d 1343, 1346 (1978) (holding that one cannot be deemed to
be a habitual offender where the defendant was not convicted of the prior offense
before he committed the principal offense, in part, because the purpose of the habitual
offender enhancement is to punish those who have been granted a chance to reform
but have failed to avail themselves of that opportunity).
Mr. Beavers urges this Court to follow the majority rule and give the sentencing
enhancements at issue in this case a faithful, logical interpretation. Assuming it does
so, it should hold that the convictions in Mr. Beavers' First Case could not be used to
enhance his sentences in the Second Case and, therefore, Mr. Beavers is entitled to a
new sentencing hearing.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Beavers respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his convictions and remand both of his cases for new trials, wherein he will be
allowed to present his necessity defense and have the respective juries instructed on
the affirmative defense of necessity. In the alternative, Mr. Beavers requests that his
sentences be vacated and his cases remand for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2009.

?
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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